

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 114683

O P 280632Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5480

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 5788

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR JO US XF OREP

SUBJ: CODEL OBEY VISIT

JERUSALEM FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

1. SUMMARY: CONGRESSMAN HAD FULL DISCUSSIONS WITH KING AND PRIME MINISTER ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND BILATERAL PROBLEMS. ALSO USEFUL TALKS WITH CROWN PRINCE AND OTHER OFFICIALS CONCERNED WITH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. KING AND PM EXPRESSED CONCERN EGYPT REMOVING ITSELF FROM OVERALL SETTLEMENT PROCESS, DRIVING SAYRIA AND JORDAN INTO GREATER OSOLATION AND MUTUAL DEPENDENCE. NKING PERSONNALLY "DEPRESSED" THAT WITH EGYPT OUT, MOMENTUM TOWARD LARGER PEACE SETTLEMENT COULD END. ON BASIS HIS RECNT VISIT TO SYRIA, KING DOUBTED ISRAELIS WOULD WITHDRAW FROM STRATEGIC GOLAN LOCATIONS. BY SAME TOKEN KING SO STRUCK BY ISRAELI STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES IN GOLAN THAT THE REVIUNG HIS PREVIOUS CERTAINTY THAT ISRAEL INEVITABLEY WOULD INVADE SYRIAN VIA JORDAN. CONGRESSMAN NOTED THEIR IMPRESSION GAINED IN SYRIA THAT GOLAN WITHDRAWAL ALONG NOT ENOUGH. PRIME MINISTER RIFAI REPLIED HIS IMPRESSION THAT ASAD READY TO ACEPT FULL PEACE AGREEMENT IN EXCHANGE FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL AND SOME SETTLEMENT OF PALESTINIAN PRO

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BLEM. KING ALSO SAID HE WAS DISTURBED BY FACT THAT US COMMITMENTS

NOW REGULARLY BEING OVERTURNED BY CONGRESS AND SAID THAT THIS HAD ALREADY INJURED US/GOJ RELATIONS. BOTH KING AND PM RAISED HAWK MISSILE ISSUE, GIVING FAMILIAR DEFENSE ARGUMENT AND IMPACT OF IMPASSE ON GREATER US CREDIBILITY. SPECIFICALLY RAFFIRMED NO RPT NO WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON 14 BATTERIES. KING CLAIMED HE SEEKS NO ROLE IN FUTURE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS ARAB COUNTRIES INDICATE THEIR WISH TO ALTER RABAT AGREEMENT. ON ECONOMIC MATTERS CROWN PRINCE IN REPLY TO CONGRESSMEN'S QUESTION AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO GOAL OF GRADUAL REDUCTION IN BUDGET SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE BUT UNABLE TO GIVE TARGET DATES. HE EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF RIFT VALLEY IN FUTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.

CABLE IS UNCLEARED AND SUBJECT TO COMMENT AND CORRECTION BY CODEL. END SUMMARY.

2. CODEL OBEY VISITED JORDAN FOR 18 HOURS AUGUST 26 AND 27. SHORTLY AFTE ARRIVAL SAW SUCCESSIVELY CROWN PRINCE HASSAN PRIME MINISTER RIFAI AND KING HUSSEIN. KING JOINED GROUP IN PRIME MINISTER OFFICER FOR MID EVEING DICUSSION LASTING ONE HOUR. GROUP DINED AT RESIDENCE WITH GROUP OF JORDANIAN AND US ECONOMISTS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND BUDGETING AND BUSINESSMEN. GROUP BRIEFED AT BREAKFAST BY SENIOR EMBASSY OFFICERS.

3. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN: AFTER INTRODUCTORY STATEMENTS BY CONGRESSMAN OBEY (REPEATED FOR EACH CALL) ABOUT NATURE OF GROUP AND ITS INTERESTS (PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE AND US ASSISTANCE AND ITS PALCE) TALK FIRST CENTERED ON PEACE PROSPECTS. HASSAN INDICATED THAT JORDANIANS HAD SUPPORTED SINAI INITIATIVE BUT HAD NOW COME TO FEEL THAT EGYPT GIVING TOO MUCH AND THAT NON BELLIGENCY OF EGYPT WOULD ISOLATE JORDAN AND SYRIA. THIS TENDED TO PUSH JORDAN AND SYRIA CLOSER TOGETHER. WLSO WHILE LEVEL OF US AID TO ISRAEL IN RETURN NOW KNOWN SOMETHING ON ORDER OF 2 OR 3 BILLION DOLLARS A VERY HIGH PRICE TO PAY FOR A SMALL STEP ON SINAI. SYRIA WORRIED ABOUT ANOTHER STEP ON GOLAN AND THERE WRE DOUBTS US COULD PULL THIS OFF, PARTICULARLY IN AN ELECTION YEAR. SOME EVEN THOUGHT US MIGHT HAVE AGREED WITH ISRAEL THAT ONLY
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A PRO FORMA ATTEMPT ON THE GOLAN WOULD BE MADE. SOME THOUGHT THAT ISRAEL SHOULD HAE MADE A REAL ATTEMPT WITH ITS NEIGHBORS (SYRIA/JORDAN) RATHER THAN SETTling THINGS WITH A COUNTRY WHICH WAS PART WAY INTO AFRICA.

4. DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. CROWN PRINCE OUTLINED JORDAN'S ECONOMIC PROBLEM AND BASIS STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE IN FAMILIAR TERMS. HE SKETCHED OUT WITH THE

AID OF A MAP THE RIFT VALLEY THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AREA AND THE OUTLINE OF FUTURE PROJECTS. QUESTIONING CENTERED ON DETAILS OF A NUMBER OF THESE POINTS AND THEN TURNED TO THE ISSUE OF BUDGET SUPPORT. CROWN PRINCE WAS ASKED ABOUT THE FUTURE NEED FOR BUDGET SUPPORT AND WHEN IT COULD BE PHASED OUT, POSSIBLY TO BE REPLACED BY DEVELOPMENT AID. IN REPLY HE SAID IN EFFECT NO FIRM TIME COULD BE GIVEN MAYBE BY 1980-86 JORDAN COULD BECOME SELF SUFFICIENT IN FOOD. JORDAN AGREED WITH THE NEED HOWEVER TO INCREASE AMOUNT OF AID IN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND WOULD ACCEPT GRADUAL REDUCTION IN BUDGET SUPPORT. PRINCE IN PASSING POINTED TO HIS OWN POSITION, NEITHER OF THE GOVERNMENT NOR A RULING FIGURE BUT THE NATIONAL "ENERGIZER" OF EFFORT TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THUS WHAT HE SAID AND DID IN THESE MATERS HAD TO BE UNDERSTOOD IN THAT LIGHT. DISCUSSION WAS EXTENSIVE.

5. WITH THE PRIME MINISTER THE INITIAL EXCHANGES CONCERNED THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING SITUATION. RIFAI WAS SOMEWHAT MORE CAREFUL IN HIS POINTS ABOUT BEING DISCOURAGED WITH THE PRESENT SITUATION, TALKED AT THE REQUEST OF THE CONGRESSMEN ABOUT THE SYRIAN VIEWS WHICH THEY HAD HEARD AND GAVE A SHORT REPORT ON SYRIAN ATTITUDES AS HE UNDERSTOOD THEM. HE REPEATED IN LOWER KEY FEELINGS THAT EGYPT MIGHT BE PAYING TOO MUCH AND TAKEN OUT OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. CONGRESSMAN EMPHASIZED IN RETURN THEIR BELIEF THAT SADAT,

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5481

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 5788

EXDIS

WITH WHOM THEY AHD RECENTLY SPOKE, WAS GENUINELY COMMITTED TO A BROAD PEACE INITIATIVE AND CODEL SAID THAT SADAT HAD INSISTED EFFORTS ON THE GOAL HAD TO BEGIN ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. ON SYRIAN CONGRESSMEN REGRETTE NOT HAVING SEEN ASAD, AND SAID THAT ALMOST INIVERSALLY SYRIANS WITH WHOM THEY HAD MET HAD DISCOUNTED POSSIBILITY HAT SYRIA WOULD ACEPT A PEACE TREATY IN RETURN FOR A FULL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GOLAN, ADDING IN TURN FUTHER CONDITIONS ABOUT PALESTINIAN RIGHTS, 1947 PARTITION PLAN, BORDERS AND ETC. RIFAI SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK SYRIA WOULD AGREE TO A FULL PEACE ON THEBASIS ONLY OF EVACUATION OF THE GOLAN, BUT ONLY OF ALL THE OTHER TERRITORIES. (HE WAS NONCOMMITTAL ON THE ISSUE OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS) BUT HE SAID IT WAS TOO BAD THEY HAD NOT TALKED WITH ASAD WHO WAS READY TO AGREE TO PEACE IN RETURN FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL.BOTH KING AND PRIME MINISTER TOLD CODEL THEY DID NOT BELIEVE ASAD IS HEADED IN NEAR FUTURE TOWARDS WAR. LATER WHEN RIFAI PRESSED CONGRESSMAN KOCH AS TO WHY ISRAEL WOULD NOT AGREE TO PRINCIPAL OF FULL WITHDRAWAL IN RETURN FOR A FULL PEACE, RIFAI SAID THAT FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL, BY STAGES, ARABS WOULD WORK OUT FULL PACE BY STAGES INCLUDING FULL INTERCOURSE ACROSS BORDERS ETC, IN LAST STAGES.

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7. WITH PRIME MINISTER TALK ALSO TURNED TO HAWK MISSILE DEAL. RIFAI EXPLAINED IN FAMILIAR TERM THE NEED FOR THE MISSILES IN JORDAN THE FACT THAT THEY WOULD BE DEPLOYED TO DEFEND AMMAN ARAQA AND AIR BASES TO THE EAST AND SOUTH OF AMMAN AND THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION OF ATTACKING ISRAEL WITH THEM.

7. KING ARRIVED AT THIS POINT AND PROVIDED LENGTHY SUMMARY OF HIS VIEWS ON THE PRESENT SITUATION, EXPRESSING MORE PESSISSIMISM ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION, SAYING IN EFFECT THAT HE WAS VERY "DEPRESSED" WITH WHAT WAS HAPPENING. HE ADMITTED THAT JORDAN HAD SUPPORTED A STEP BY STEP PROCESS AND FELT THAT MOMENTUM WAS IMPORTANT BUT NOW THAT IT LOOKED LIKE EGYPT WAS BEING TAKEN OUT OF THE PROCESS HE SAW HOPE FOR FORWARD MOVEMENT BEING ENDED. FURTHER HE HAD LITTLE FEELING AFTER SEEING KUNEITRA AND THE GOLAN THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD EVER MOVE. THE HILLS WHICH THEY CONTROLLED DOMINATED THE CENTER AXIS OF ATTACK AND HE HAD REVISED HIS VIEWS THAT JORDAN WOULD BE INEVITABLY SUBJECT TO ATTACK ON ANOTHER WAR. IT WAS SO EASY FOR THE ISRALIS TO MOVE IN OVER KUNEITRA THAT A SWEEP THROUGH NORTH JORDAN NOW SEEMED LESS PROBABLY TO HIM. HE ALSO SAID HOW DISTURBED HE WAS BY THE ISRAELI DESTRUCTION

WHICH HE HAD SEEN IN KUNEITRA.

8. KING THEN TALKED ABOUT THE HAWK MISSILES SALE AND THE EFFECT WHICH THE TREATMENT OF THIS HAD ALREADY HAD IN THE CONFIDENCE WITH WHICH HE COULD CONTINUE TO TREAT US COMMITMENT IN THE FUTURE. FURTHER THE CONGRESS SHOULD ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT JORDAN WAS ACTIVELY FIGHTING SOVIET TRAINED GUERRILLAS IN THE GULF AND HAD SPENT 25 YEAR COUNTERACTING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE AREA. MUCH AS HE REGRETTED IT, SOVIETS PRODUCED ONLY SAM SYSTEM COMPARABLE TO HAWK AND HE HAD TO HAVE SOME MINIMAL AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IF THE CONGRESS REFUSED HIM. THE SOVIETS SEEMED ONLY TOO READY TO PROVIDE THE EQUIPMENT. HE HOPED OF COURSE THIS WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. CONGRESSMAN OBEY ASKED WHY KING NEEDED 14 HAWKS: SOME COMPROMISE WOULD PROBABLY BE REQUIRED. COULD THE KING TAKE 8 OR SO? THE KING AND RIFAI SAID THAT 14 WAS MINIMUM NEEDED AND THAT HE COULD NOT COMPROMISE. IN SPITE OF EXTENSIVE QUESTIONING BY THE MEMBERS OF CODEL ON
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THIS POINT KING SAID THAT HE NEEDED 14 AND COULD NOT BUY HALF AN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. CONGRESSMEN WERE TOLD BY AMBASSADOR THAT PRESENT DELIVERY SCHEDULE WAS SPREAD OUT, THAT JORDAN WAS BUYING NOT BEING GIVEN SYSTEMS.
THAT FULL ORDER HAD TO BE PLACED AT ONE TIME AND THAT EXECUTIVE BRANCH FULLY SUPPORTED THE NUMBER 14 WHICH WAS ARRIVED AT AFTER CAREFUL STUDY AND EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH GOJ.

9. CONGRESSMEN INQUIRED ABOUT KING'S POSSIBLE FUTURE ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS TO WHICH HE RESPONDED THAT RABAT HAD DECIDED THAT POINT AND HE WOULD NOT COME BACK INTO THE PICTURE UNLESS ARABS CHANGED THEIR VIEW HE IMPLIED THERE WAS LITTLE CHANCE OF THAT HAPPENING. HE ALSO SKETCHED OUT ISRAELI MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR NEGOTIATIONS LAST YEAR FOR WEST BANK DISENGAGEMENT ON WHICH HE BLAMED IN LARGE MEASURE RABAT DECISION.
10. AT END OF MEETING WITH KING AND PRIME MINISTER, CONGRESSMAN OBEY EXPRESSED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF BUDGET SUPPORT PROBLEM FOR JORDAN AS EXPLAINED BY CROWN PRINCE AND ALSO THANKS KING AND PRIME MINISTER TIME AND EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION OF JORDANIAN VIEWS. PARTICULARLY ON THE HAWK MISSILE QUESTIONS. KING WAS COMPLETELY FRANK ABOUT HIS FEARS THAT HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH US WAS BEING CHANGED BY ACTIONS OF CONGRESS AND SAID HE HOPED IT WOULD NOT COME TO PASS BUT SAW EVERY SIGN THAT THIS WAS THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS KING SAID HE HAD NO STRONG FEELINGS ABOUT US CIVILIANS IN THE SINAI AND DID NOT WANT TO BE IN A POSITION OF HAVING DECIDED ON THE US LEVEL OF AID OF ISRAEL. THAT SHOULD BE DONE ON THE BASIS OF CONGRESS VIEWS OF THE US NATIONAL INTEREST. HOWEVER IF IT REQUIRED \$3.25 BILLION TO INSURE JORDAN HAWKS THAT WAS NOT A LEVEL ASSISTANCE HE COULD SUPPORT. RIFAI ADDED THAT IN VIEW

OF THE REPORTS OF INCREASES FOR ISRAEL, JORDAN WAS PREPARING
A LIST OF REQUESTED INCREASES FOR ITSELF TO PRESENT TO
THE SECRETARY. BUT IF ISRAEL GOT NOTHING MORE JORDAN COULD
EVEN AGREE TO FOREGO HAWK AND STAY WITH THE PRESENT LEVEL OF ITS
AID PROGRAM (\$100M)

11. CONVERSATION AT DINNER AND BREAKFAST COVERED ROUGHLY
SAME SUBJECTS WITH HEAVY FOCUS ON THE FUTURE PEACE PROCESS.

12. VISIT WAS SHORT BUT IN WORDS OF DEPARTING
CONGRESSMEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL.

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Message Attributes

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